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INTRODUCTION
In 1875, the American Express Company established a private,
noncontributory' pension plan for its employees, the first such plan in North
America.2 This plan, and those established in the ensuing years, was a
response to the social upheavals of the Industrial Revolution. Primarily, the
new urban family structure no longer provided for care of the aged as the
rural family had done. Society therefore looked to industry to fill this gap,
by means of the private pension system.' Private pension funds have recently
experienced tremendous growth in importance, complexity, and actual mon-
etary value.
Congress perceived a need for legislation in this area and in 1974 enacted
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).4 New legislation,
however, often creates an additional dilemma for the courts because questions
arise as to the application and interpretation of the law. Since many questions
have arisen regarding the interpretation of ERISA, the courts are charged
with the responsibility of developing a new federal common law with respect
to employee benefit plans.5
One such problem for judicial policy-makers arises with respect to pension
plan terminations. ERISA insures payment of benefits by means of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in the event a plan terminates
with insufficient assets in relation to its liabilities. However, a plan which
terminates with an excess of assets over liabilities is the source of much
controversy. ERISA provides for reversion of surplus assets to the employer
in specified circumstances, but this provision has been and continues to be
challenged frequently in the courts.
This Note discusses the determination of the legal status of surplus pension
assets upon termination of Defined Benefit Plans. 6 It begins by tracing the
1. A "noncontributory" plan is one in which the employees themselves make no contri-
butions.
2. W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC PoLcY 27-28 (1976).
3. For a thorough discussion of the advent of private pensions in the United States, see
id. at 27-35.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461 (1982).
5. Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980).
6. Private pension plans generally fall into one of two categories: Defined Benefit Plans
or Defined Contribution Plans. In the former, the employee's benefit is predetermined by
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evolution of the theories behind private pension plans. It next examines the
arguments for and against allowing reversion. The Note concludes by sug-
gesting possible solutions to apparent conflicts between the original purpose
of ERISA and judicial policy.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL THEORY OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, pension disputes were decided in the
courts under a variety of legal theories. Changes in these theories kept pace
with changes in society's view of the employer/employee relationship. The
earliest pension cases were resolved by applying the gratuity theory, under
which pensions were held to be mere gratuities creating no enforceable rights
in the employees. The New York Supreme Court first expressed this theory
in 1898 in McNevin v. Solvay Process Co. 7 Plaintiff McNevin brought suit
to recover approximately fifty dollars as his share of his employer's non-
contributory pension plan. The court held in favor of the employer, em-
phasizing the voluntary nature of the defendant's actions in establishing the
plan. The court held that only actual payment of a pension benefit would
give an employee a vested interest in the fund. Prior to payment, any such
benefit remained "an inchoate gift." 8 The gratuity theory prevailed through
the early decades of the twentieth century. Early pension plans were almost
always construed in favor of the employer. 9
The courts gradually began to express dissatisfaction with the gratuity
theory and its extreme pro-employer orientation, 10 and they adopted various
theories which recognized that valid consideration for the employer's promise
means of a formula utilizing variables such as years of service and earnings. A Defined
Contribution Plan requires the employer to predetermine his contributions. Thus, the employee
receives a retirement benefit equal to the employer's contributions plus any investment gains
or minus any losses. This Note will deal exclusively with Defined Benefit Plans because, by
definition, a surplus cannot exist under a Defined Contribution Plan. For a comprehensive
comparison of these two plan types, see EMPLOYEE BENEFIr RESEARCH INsTrruTE, FUNDAMENTALS
OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PRoGRAMs 41-49 0983).
7. 32 A.D. 610, 53 N.Y.S. 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898).
8. Id. at 612-13, 53 N.Y.S. at 99-100.
9. See, e.g., Fickling v. Pollard, 51 Ga. App. 54, 179 S.E. 582 (1935); Cowles v. Morris
& Co., 330 IlL 11, 161 N.E. 150 (1928).
10. This dissatisfaction is apparent in the court's opinion in MacCabe v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 30 N.Y.S.2d 445 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941):
[W]here, as here, the retirement Plan is not included in a contract between the
employer and employee, the courts are without choice but to hold that the benefits
therein described are entirely voluntary and gratuitous on the part of the employer.
This conclusion of the law does not necessarily coincide with actuality and in
some cases may be so contrary to fact as to shock the conscience of the court
that utters it. The law should keep pace with social progress but in the very nature
of the judicial process it must be a laggard as courts of original jurisdiction await
the lighting of each new torch in our appellate tribunals.
Id. at 447 (citations omitted).
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to pay pension benefits flowed out of the employment relationship." Em-
ployees finally were able to enforce contractual rights under noncontributory
plans.2
Some courts began to view pension plans as unilateral contracts. 3 Adopting
a plan of which the employees were aware constituted the offer. Continued
faithful employment furnished consideration for the employer's promise to
pay pension benefits. Many courts viewed the central purpose of a pension
plan as securing a benefit for the employer in retaining the "loyalty and
continued service of the employees.' '14 For the first time, the "reasonable
expectations" of the employees 5 became a primary consideration.
A similar theory of pensions developed from the same concept of the
employer/employee relationship. Courts applying the deferred wages theory
characterized pension benefits as compensation for services actually rendered
by the employee.' 6 This partial compensation was deferred as an inducement
for the quality service of the employee. The deferred wages theory of pension
benefits became the prevailing view among courts until the enactment of
ERISA in 1974 and was pervasive enough to be incorporated into the Internal
Revenue Service Regulations governing the tax qualification of pension plans.' 7
II. BRIEF HISTORY AND CONTENT OF ERISA
Although the evolution of legal pension theory moved in a direction
favorable to employees' rights, abuses of the pension system were widespread
during the years prior to ERISA. The legal doctrines developed by the courts
did not solve the problem of pension fund abuses because the rights they
recognized were enforceable against the fund, not against the employer.
Even among workers covered by private plans, actual receipt of benefits
was by no means assured. A variety of factors contributed to the tenuous
nature of pension benefit payments. Only one-third of those workers covered
were vested because of stringent vesting standards. Employees, even if vested,
had no assurance of actual payment because of the possibility of inadequate
funding. Plan administration was sometimes executed dishonestly or un-
wisely, as in a failure to diversify investments with plan assets. Portfolio
11. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
12. See Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 405, 410, 171 N.E.2d 518, 521
(1960).
13. See Parsley v. Wyoming Automotive Co., 395 P.2d 291, 295 (Wyo. 1964).
14. See Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 144 Conn. 456, 463, 133 A.2d 894, 897 (1957).
15. Id.
16. See SabI v. Laenderbank Wien Aktiengesellschaft, 30 N.Y.S.2d 608, 616 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1941); Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 48 Ohio App. 450, 454, 194 N.E. 441, 443 (1935).
17. A "qualified" plan, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 401, is exempt from taxation under 26
U.S.C. § 501(a) and entitles the employer to deductions for contributions to such plan under
26 U.S.C. § 404 in much the same way as such contributions would reduce taxable income if
they were paid as employee compensation in the current period.
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appreciation allowed a reduction in employer contributions, but losses were
usually borne by plan beneficiaries because a company had no legal obligation
to increase contributions."8
No comprehensive pension legislation existed prior to the promulgation
of ERISA. Only three statutes addressed the private pension system in any
significant manner.1 9 The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (the
Taft-Hartley Act20° addressed the administration of collectively-bargained
pension plans and granted special jurisdiction to federal courts over contracts
between employers and employee labor organizations, which included pension
contracts. The Federal Welfarg and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 195821
was another piece of legislation having only a peripheral effect on the private
pension system as a whole. As the title suggests, this legislation required
disclosure of pertinent information regarding pension funds, such as a basic
"description" and an annual report. Finally, the Internal Revenue Code of
195 4 22 offered the most meaningful pre-ERISA pension regulation by placing
restrictions on those plans seeking tax-qualified status. There was, however,
widespread sentiment that existing regulations were inadequate in light of
the growing magnitude and complexity of the nation's private pension system.21
The legislative response was ERISA, enacted in September of 1974. ERISA
does not require establishment of a plan, but sets forth a comprehensive list
of minimum standards to be met in areas such as vesting, funding, and
disclosure, should such a plan be established.
The legislative history of ERISA indicates that Congress drafted the statute
with several goals in mind. The Act was designed to:
(1) establish equitable standards of plan administration; (2) mandate
minimum standards of plan design with respect to the vesting of plan
benefits; (3) require minimum standards of fiscal responsibility by re-
quiring the amortization of unfunded liabilities; (4) insure the vested
portion of unfunded liabilities against the risk of premature plan ter-
mination; and (5) promote a renewed expansion of private retirement
18. J. TREYNOR, P. REGAN & W. PRIET, THE FINANciAL REA=IT OF PENSION FuNDING
UNDER ERISA 5-7 (1976).
19. For a thorough discussion of these three regulatory acts, see E. PATTERSON, LEGAL
PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PENSION EXPECTATIONS 85-108 (1960).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09, repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-461 (1982).
22. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9602 (1982).
23. During the ERISA hearings, Congressman Joseph Gaydos commented on the inadequacy
of the Internal Revenue Code for the regulation of private pensions:
Since the primary function of this law is to produce revenue and prevent tax
evasion, enforcement consists in the Internal Revenue Service's grant or disallow-
ance of "qualified status" to a pension plan. Accordingly, there is only a very
limited protection for the rights of the participants and beneficiaries of a plan.
120 CoNG. REc. 4281 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1974) (statement of Cong. Gaydos).
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plans and increase the number of participants receiving private retirement
benefits.-
ERISA was, in short, promulgated for the dual purposes of providing pro-
tection for beneficiaries under existing plans and encouraging the growth
and development of the private pension system as a whole. Congress did,
however, recognize the inherent tension between these two goals. Legislators
deemed it important to strike a delicatq balance between those constraints
stringent enough to adequately protect beneficiaries' rights, and those which
allowed enough flexibility of employer discretion that plan creation would
not be discouraged.Y Any analysis of the provisions of ERISA must, there-
fore, include due consideration of these conflicting policies.
III. TERMINATION PROVISIONS UNDER ERISA
Although pension plans ideally continue to exist indefinitely,26 ERISA does
preserve the employer's right of termination. Sections 1301 through 1381
provide plan termination insurance in the form of the PBGC; sections 1341
through 1344 provide actual procedures for plan termination. ERISA pro-
vides no statutory definition of plan termination. Thus, the PBGC developed
its own definition: in general, a voluntary plan termination occurs when all
accruals27 have ceased and the plan sponsor has permanently discontinued
all contributions to the plan.21
Voluntary terminations may be undertaken for various reasons. A plan
may become financially burdensome to its sponsor company, 29 for example,
or the company may wish to sponsor a different type of plan.30 The initial
action required to begin a voluntary plan termination is a written request
to the PBGC for a "notice of sufficiency" of plan assets.3 1 When the notice
is received, the employer may terminate the plan and distribute the assets.32
24. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AxDmN.
NEws 4640.
25. Summary of Major Provisions of S. 4: Williams-Javits Pension Reform Bill, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 118 (1973) (remarks by Jacob K. Javits, co-sponsor of S. 4).
26. The "Rule of Permanence" requires that a qualified plan be intended to be permanent.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1956); Rev. Rul. 69-25, 1969-1 C.B. 113, §§ 2, 3. Termination
within a short time of adoption is regarded as evidence that the plan was intended to be
temporary, unless contrary evidence can be furnished. See Rev. Rul. 69-25 at § 2.02.
27. For a statutory definition of an "accrued benefit," see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (1982).
28. D. McGr.L, FuNJAsmENrAJs OF PRIVATE PENSioNS 431 (1975).
29. See, e.g., Audio Fidelity Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 624-F.2d 513, 515 (4th
Cir. 1980).
30. See, e.g., Pollock v. Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d
575 (2d Cir. 1980) (plan changed from Defined Benefit to profit-sharing).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a), (b) (1982).
32. If the assets are determined to be insufficient, the termination will proceed according
to 29 U.S.C. § 1342 relating to involuntary terminations.
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More controversial, however, is the situation in which plan assets are of
greater value than accrued benefits. In such circumstances, the disposition
of the surplus becomes an issue. No actual surplus can exist prior to plan
termination because the PBGC will only "officially" value plan assets in
response to a notice of an employer's intention to terminate." Although a
surplus can probably be quite accurately anticipated and valued by an actuary
prior to termination, the surplus itself does not exist until the plan is ter-
minated.
According to ERISA, an employer may recover a surplus only if it is
attributable to "erroneous actuarial computation"; 34 that is, if the expected
costs of the plan exceed actual costs.3 5 Section 1344(d)(1) establishes three
additional requirements for reversion: all liabilities of the plan must be
satisfied; the plan itself must provide for reversion; and the reversion must
not violate any other provision of law.36 Although the statute therefore
expressly provides for reversion, the propriety of surplus recapture should
not be taken for granted. The issue requires the weighing of numerous
practical and theoretical considerations, which will be discussed in the next
section.
IV. SHOULD ANY REVERSION BE PERMITTED?
Whether or not to allow recovery of excess pension assets is a controversy
that pre-dates the enactment of ERISA. Prior to ERISA, cases of this type
were often decided on principles of trust law.17 Once the purpose of a trust
has been accomplished, any surplus automatically reverts to the settlor.38
With respect to pension plans, once all vested benefits have been paid, any
surplus automatically reverts to the pension sponsor. In the years following
promulgation of the Internal Revenue Code, decisions often centered upon
satisfaction of Code requirements. 39
Since the enactment of ERISA, disgruntled beneficiaries continue to chal-
lenge an employer's right to surplus reversion. The courts, however, have
quite consistently supported the employer's right to recapture,4 while carving
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
34. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-2(b)(1) (1986).
35. Id.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
37. See, e.g., In re Marine Midland Trust Co., 144 N.Y.S.2d 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
38. RESTATEmNT (SEcoND) OF Tn LAW OF TRUSTS § 430 (1959).
39. See, e.g., Lynch v. Dawson Collieries, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1972).
40. See Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1982); Pollock v. Cas-
trovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980); In re C.D.
Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem. sub nom. In re C.D.
Moyer Co. Pension Trust, 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978).
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out only a few exceptions to this policy.4 1 Plaintiffs in these cases have
raised a variety of questions regarding the propriety of surplus reversions.
The courts, unfortunately, have left many of those questions unanswered,
or at least have given some rather nebulous answers.
A. The Case Against Reversion
1. The "Reasonable Expectations" Argument
Since the gradual demise of the gratuity theory, a recurring theme of
judicial opinions in pension cases has been the protection of "the employees'
reasonable expectations of receiving the promised reward." 42 Under this
theory, pension plans have become an integral part of the offer of employ-
ment since employees reaching retirement age reasonably expect to receive
these promised benefits.4 3
The role of employee expectations in the distribution of surplus assets is
somewhat more tenuous. Surpluses obviously are not an integral part of an
employee's expected compensation. The "reasonable expectations" argu-
ment, therefore, is viable only in situations where an employer has taken
some action which would create such an expectation in the employee's mind.
This type of situation occurs when the plan document expressly grants the
entire corpus of the fund, including any excess due to erroneous computation,
to the employees in the event of termination." Although the typical employee
will probably not have actual notice of such a provision, ERISA requires
that each employee be furnished with a "summary plan description" which
must be "sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise...
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan." 45
Beneficiaries also must be informed of any "material modification in the
terms of the plan.""
ERISA's strict disclosure requirements thus furnish constructive (if not
actual) notice of plan provisions to all employees. If an employee knows or
should know the provisions of the pension plan, and that the plan expressly
grants any excess assets to the participants, then the employee can reasonably
expect to receive a share of the surplus upon termination.
41. The most common such exception is that employers may not recapture a surplus if
retroactive (i.e., after termination) plan amendments are used to do so. See Audio Fidelity
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 624 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1980).
42. Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 144 Conn. 456, 463, 133 A.2d 894, 897 (1957).
43. See E. PAT=RSON, supra note 19, at 4-5.
44. See, e.g., Walsh v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 959 (3d Cir. 1983) (plan
originally granting any surplus to company amended to grant all funds to plan members in
event of termination).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1982).
46. Id.
1987]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The forerunner of the "reasonable expectations" theory is the doctrine
of estoppel, which was often used in pre-ERISA cases. In Lynch v. Dawson
Collieries, Inc.,47 the defendant employer ceased business operations and
terminated its pension plan. A booklet provided to the members stated that
any surplus which might accrue in the plan would be distributed to the
employees. Plaintiff argued that defendant should be estopped from recap-
turing the surplus on the basis of these statements. 48
The Lynch court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the court
found no evidence that any participant(s) suffered a detriment in reliance
on these statements.4 9 Second, because plan contributions were "wholly
voluntary on the part of the company, ' 50 the court reasoned that the com-
pany could have ceased contributions at any time, leaving no basis for an
employee to expect that a surplus would ever arise.5 1
Leaving aside any discussion regarding the soundness of the reasoning in
Lynch, 52 the court's opinion supplies a framework through which modem
"reasonable expectations" theory may be analyzed. Consider the court's
statement that plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of reliance on the promise
of receiving a share of the surplus. Under "reasonable expectations" doc-
trine, the role of reliance is greatly reduced. In fact, New Jersey courts have
eliminated the requirement of reliance completely in applying the "reasonable
expectations" doctrine to insurance policy disputes53 as well as to pension
plans .54
ERISA itself eliminates the rationale behind the Lynch argument that the
employer could have stopped its voluntary plan contributions at any time.
Once established, pension plans are no longer "wholly voluntary ' 5 5 and
completely subject to the employer's will. A post-ERISA plaintiff facing the
fact situation presented in Lynch has a strong argument using the "reasonable
expectations" doctrine.
Recent cases, however, have not presented an opportunity to fully test the
merits of the "reasonable expectations" theory. Plaintiffs in Van Orman v.
American Insurance Co. 56 for example, raised the "reasonable expectations"
47. 485 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1972).
48. Id. at 496.
49. Id. Detriment is an essential element in the doctrine of estoppel. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS, American Law Institute § 84 comment b (1981).
50. Lynch, 485 S.W.2d at 496.
51. Id.
52. The court's contention that the employees had no basis for anticipating any future
surplus is open to question. If the plan booklet expressly addressed the issue of surplus
distribution, certainly an employee could have reasonably interpreted this to mean that the
possibility of a surplus existed.
53. See Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961).
54. See Hurd v. Hutnik, 419 F. Supp. 630, 655 (D.N.J. 1976) (applying doctrine to pension
plan).
55. Lynch, 485 S.W.2d at 496.
56. 680 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1982).
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argument. Plan participants in Van Orman were furnished with a booklet
purporting to provide a "detailed explanation" of the plan. The booklet
stated that in "the event the Plan is terminated, all funds held in trust will
be used for the-benefit of retired employees and active Participants and the
Beneficiaries of deceased employees. '5 7 The booklet also contained a dis-
claimer to the effect that all statements therein were "qualified by reference
to the Plan itself."58s The plan document granted any surplus existing upon
termination to the company.
Plaintiffs did not prevail on their claim to recover this surplus. In light
of the disclaimer, there is little question about the propriety of this holding.
The opinion states that the disclaimer served as adequate notice to plan
participants that only the official plan document, not the booklet, governed
their rights.5 9 The Van Orman decision, however, leaves open the question
as to whether, in the absence of proper notice such as the disclaimers, the
plaintiff might have prevailed on the "reasonable expectations" theory 0
The expectations doctrine, although beneficial to plaintiffs in situations
similar to Lynch, falls short as the sole justification for refusing to allow
surplus reversions. As is apparent in Van Orman, not all employers make
representations regarding the disposition of surplus assets which would lead
an employee to a reasonable expectation of receiving such a stim. In addition,
the viability of the "reasonable expectations" argument in the case against
reversion is substantially lessened by the reluctance of the majority of courts
to accept the New Jersey courts' doctrine of not requiring detrimental re-
liance.
2. The Legislative Purpose Argument
The enactment of ERISA in 1974 signalled a change in public policy with
respect to private pensions. The change was one of focus-from regulation
primarily for purposes of tax considerations, to regulation emphasizing con-
cern for employee security. 6' A basic goal of the Act is to encourage the
57. Id. at 304.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 308.
60. Cf. Bryant v. International Fruit Prods. Co., Inc., 793 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1986). The
agreement in Bryant prohibited reversion by means of the language, "'In no event and under
no circumstances . . . ."' Id. at 123. The court invalidated a later amendment by the plan
sponsor which attempted to allow reversion, holding that the unambiguous language in the
earlier document precluded the amendment. It held that the "pension plan assured the partic-
ipating employees that, once contributed, no money paid into the fund could ever be reclaimed
by the company." Id. (emphasis added). One can infer from this language that the Bryant
court based its decision upon the "reasonable expectations" theory. Without an explicit state-
ment to this effect, however, plaintiffs can find little additional guidance from Bryant as to
whether the "reasonable expectations" argument is a viable theory, and if so, whether it is
limited to fact situations involving unambiguous plan language.
61. See W. GREENOUGH & F. KiNG, supra note 2, at 67.
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continuation and maintenance of these plans. A fundamental premise in the
area of pension law provides that a plan must be formed with the intent
that it be permanent. 62 Any policy which makes termination attractive to
plan sponsors, therefore, will undermine legislative intent.
ERISA's relatively lenient minimum standards for reversion and consistent
judicial support of employer claims in the area can be construed as incentives
to terminate. Pension funds containing potential63 surpluses offer plan spon-
sors an easily accessible source of cash. Unconditional legislative and judicial
sanction of surplus recapture, therefore, arguably makes the option of ter-
mination more attractive to the plan sponsor than stable maintenance of
one continuous plan.
The vital question, however, is not whether lenient reversion standards
lead to increased terminations, but rather whether terminations harm the
pension beneficiaries which ERISA purports to protect. Congressional hear-
ings on pension legislation pointed out that pre-ERISA terminations often
resulted in lost employee benefits. 64 Although ERISA eliminated many of
the causes of these losses through strict participation and vesting require-
ments, 65 minimum funding standards" and creation of the PBGC, 67 termi-
nation still presents certain risks to plan participants.
One manner in which plan terminations may adversely affect beneficiaries
is that a plan sponsor may replace a terminated Defined Benefit plan with
a plan that inadequately protects employees' retirement benefits. For the
last forty years, Defined Benefit plans have been the dominant plan form.
A recent trend, however, is towards terminating these plans to establish
Defined Contribution plans. 68 The Defined Contribution plan transfers the
risks of poor fund performance to the employee and makes the level of
future retirement income a virtual unknown for the pre-retirement worker. 69
An employee who is subjected to increased financial risk and uncertainty
clearly has suffered a detriment.
It is also argued that increasing the number of plan terminations decreases
the likelihood that new plans of any kind will be adopted to replace the old
ones.7 0 Re-establishing a plan following termination is a complex, time-
62. See supra note 26.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
64. A 1972 study by the Departments of Labor and the Treasury indicated that 1227 plans
terminated that year involving 42,000 participants, of whom 19,500 lost benefits amounting to
over $48.7 million. 120 CONG. REc. 29,195 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974).
65. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61 (1982).
66. Id. at §§ 1081-86.
67. Id. at §§ 1301-80.
68. Moreen, Why Choose A Defined Contribution Plan?, PENSION WoRLD, Jan. 1985, at
46.
69. See supra note 6; Hickerson v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 778 F.2d 365, 370 n.9 (7th
Cir. 1985).
70. Gaver & Freilich, Pension Plan Terminations: Background, Implications, PENSION WORMW,
Apr. 1984, at 55.
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consuming, and costly process, which might lead to an employer's reluctance
to set up a new plan after each termination. If this is true, terminations
harm plan beneficiaries in an even more profound manner.
In summary, one can argue against allowing surplus reversion by pointing
out that a primary concern of Congress in adopting ERISA was the stability
and maintenance of pension plans. Current judicial interpretation of ERISA
places few if any restrictions on an employer's right to recapture surpluses,
and thus seems to encourage termination. Employees seldom, if ever, benefit
from a termination and often suffer a detriment as a result. This presents
a fundamental conflict between legislative intent and judicial policy.
3. The Exclusive Benefit Argument
Section 1103(c)(1) of ERISA provides that "the assets of a plan shall
never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive
purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their benefi-
ciaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan. ' 7 1 Even
prior to the enactment of ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code placed the
same restriction on plans seeking tax-qualified status.7 2 The origin of this
rule of fiduciary conduct is readily apparent in light of the legislative intent
behind ERISA:7 3 to establish permanent, stable plans which are managed in
such a way as to protect the rights and interests of the participants.
A recent trend in the area of plan terminations has been termination and
surplus recapture for a "variety of corporate purposes." 74 A corporation
may, for example, use its plan surplus to increase liquidity, to carry out a
stock repurchase as an anti-takeover device, or to reduce a burdensome level
of debt.7 5 The inherent nature of the phrase "corporate purposes" suggests
a conflict with ERISA's fiduciary standards. A final argument against al-
lowing reversion, therefore, is that the prospect of surplus recapture en-
courages termination for the sole purpose of benefitting the employer. Such
terminations clearly cause plan assets to "inure to the benefit of [the]
employer," 76 and thus violate the exclusive benefit rule.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1982).
72. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(2) 0982) states that a trust is not qualified unless:
if under the trust instrument it is impossible, at any time prior to the satisfaction
of all liabilities with respect to employees or their beneficiaries under the trust,
for any part of the corpus or income to be (within the taxable year or thereafter)
used for, or diverted to, purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of his
employees or their beneficiaries ....
Id.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
74. Gaver & Freilich, supra note 69, at 54.
75. Id.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1).
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The exclusive benefit rule is a fiduciary standard. Therefore, in order to
apply the exclusive benefit rule in the context of plan terminations, the
decision to terminate must be classified as a fiduciary decision. An obvious
counterargument is that the decision to terminate an employee benefit plan
is not a fiduciary decision. 77 This viewpoint, however, conflicts with congres-
sional intent in the area of plan fiduciaries. The Joint Explanatory Statement
of the Committee of Conference defines a fiduciary as: "any person who
exercises any discretionary authority or control respecting management of a
plan, exercises any authority or control respecting the management or dis-
position of its assets or has any discretionary authority or responsibility in
the administration of the plan. ' 78 Under this broad definition, it is certainly
conceivable that Congress intended that those individuals with the power to
terminate a plan be construed as fiduciaries under ERISA. Although the
legislative history of statutes such as ERISA may be open to various inter-
pretations with respect to determining congressional intent, the courts must
nevertheless give significant consideration to such express legislative intent.
The PBGC utilized the exclusive benefit argument in In re C.D. Moyer
Co. Trust Fund.79 In Moyer, the PBGC sought to appoint a trustee to
allocate a surplus arising from the termination of a plan sponsored by the
company, based on the belief that the employer had provided for surplus
reversion by means of an improper plan amendment.80 The plan itself con-
tained a provision quite similar in wording to ERISA's exclusive benefit
rule.8 ' The PBGC based its argument in large part on the contention that
part of the trust corpus or income was improperly diverted to the employer's
benefit in contravention of this provision. In rejecting the PBGC's. rea-
soning,12 the court presented yet another obstacle to the exclusive benefit
argument. In the court's opinion, "the phrase 'trust corpus or income'...
means only such funds that are necessary to insure the Plan's specified
obligations to the participants." 3 Although the Moyer court was not inter-
77. See Gaver & Freilich, supra note 69, at 53-54.
78. BNA EDrroiAmL STAFF, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NEw PENSION REFORM LAW 124 (1974).
79. 441 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
80. Id. at 1130.
81. The Plan contained the following provision in paragraph 5.1:
It shall, however, at all times be impossible, if any alteration, amendment or
revocation be made pursuant to this provision, for any of the trust corpus or
income to be diverted to or revert to either of the employers or to be used for
any purpose other than the exclusive benefit of the participants or their benefi-
ciaries.
Id. at 1131 (emphasis added).
82. Courts generally uphold a plan sponsor's right to amend. Recently, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that unilateral amending of a plan to provide
for reversion is a breach of the employer's fiduciary duty under ERISA where the penision
agreement does not expressly allow amendment. Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928, 935
(3d Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 1132.
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preting ERISA per se, this reasoning may be applied to similar wording in
ERISA's exclusive benefit rule to determine that surplus assets do not receive
the protection of the rule.8
A New Jersey district court applied this reasoning when interpreting ERISA
in Esteves v. GAF Corp.s5 Plaintiff argued that an amendment granting any
surplus to the employer was invalid because of the exclusive benefit rule.
The court disagreed, however, saying that only the assets needed to satisfy
formula benefits-those benefits computed in the plan-are referred to by
the exclusive benefit rule.8 6
No matter how the courts decide to interpret the exclusive benefit rule
with respect to what benefits are protected, they must do so with consistency.
This is true whether or not surplus assets are included. ERISA makes no
attempt to clarify this issue, and there are equally persuasive arguments on
either side.
Holliday v. Xerox Corp.87 explores another facet of the exclusive benefit
argument. In Holliday, defendant employer transferred funds from one
pension fund to another, using these funds as a "setoff" in calculating the
benefits to which each employee was entitled under a new guaranteed min-
imum income plan.8 The transfer effectively reduced the amount of employer
contributions necessary to fund the plan. Plaintiffs argued that ERISA
prohibits any actions affecting plan assets which benefit the employer in any
way. The court, however, found "no violation of either the letter or the
spirit of ERISA, ' 89 as it considered the transfer to have the "obvious primary
purpose and effect of benefitting the employees, and in addition the incidental
side effect of being prudent from the employer's economic perspective. "90
The Holliday opinion leaves an important question unanswered. It is
unclear what effect, if any, the exclusive benefit rule has in cases where the
employees are neither benefitted nor harmed, and the employer receives the
sole benefit of the transaction. Such actions appear inconsistent with the
84. For a variation on this argument, see Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild Local
35 v. Washington Star Co., 555 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1983). The Trust Agreement in Wash-
ington Star contained language quite similar to ERISA's exclusive benefit language. Plaintiffs
argued that the exclusive benefit rule is not applicable to plan surpluses but rather is "designed
to protect against diminution or loss of anticipated, defined benefits. " Id. at 260 (emphasis
added). The court was persuaded by this reasoning. It held that it was unclear whether the
Trust Agreement language at issue was meant to apply to surplus funds, or was "intended to
merely incorporate the exclusive benefit rule ...." Id. at 261 (emphasis added). The court
seems to have accepted plaintiffs' argument that ERISA's exclusive benefit provision does not
apply to surpluses.
85. No. 82-4226, slip op. (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 1983), cited in Mamorsky & Zimmerman,
Walking the Tightrope of Pension Plan Asset Reversions, PENsION WoaR.D, March 1984, at 44.
86. Id.
87. 732 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1984).
88. Id. at 549.
89. Id. at 551.
90. Id.
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basic fiduciary concept. Plan fiduciaries must operate with "an eye single" 9'
to the welfare and interests of plan participants. If the courts wish to maintain
a pure fiduciary standard with respect to pension asset management, they
must prohibit manipulation of plan assets for the sole benefit of the em-
ployer. Plan terminations motivated strictly by the prospect of surplus re-
capture are questionable in light of ERISA's exclusive benefit rule. An
example of this type of termination is the case of termination as an anti-
takeover tactic. When recaptured surplus funds are used to perform a stock
repurchase, the transaction is clearly performed in the interests of the plan
sponsor. It is difficult to reconcile this result with ERISA's "exclusive
benefit" language. Arguments against reversion based on this provision of
ERISA warrant more thorough treatment in the courts than they have been
given up to the present.
B. The Case for Reversion
1. The Law of Trusts
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the courts looked primarily to trust
law in cases involving employee benefit plans. When a dispute arose regarding
surplus assets, the courts considered the fund a fully performed trust with
excess assets remaining. The law of trusts dictates that the transferor in such
a case is entitled to the surplus unless he has "properly manifested an
intention" to the contrary. 92 Pre-ERISA cases in the area of surplus assets
were thus overwhelmingly decided in favor of the employer, based upon
trust principles. 93
If post-ERISA pension plans are to continue to be viewed as trusts, then
the law governing them should at least be compatible with common law
trust principles. In Pollock v. Castrovinci,94 the court supported its holding
which allowed surplus reversion by stating that reversion is "consistent with
the general rule of trusts . . . . 95
The strength of this argument as a rationale for allowing reversion is
tempered by the fact that ERISA was intended to preempt all state law,
statutory as well as common, in the area of employee benefit plans. 96 Any
policy adopted by the courts should be based primarily upon interpretation
91. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 37, at § 430.
93. See, e.g., In re Marine Midland Trust Co., 144 N.Y.S.2d 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955); In
re Crescent Athletic Club, 33 F. Supp. 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
94. 476 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
95. Id. at 616.
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (c)(1) (1982).
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of the language of the statute itself.97 Although the common law policies
existing at the time of the statute's enactment can provide valuable insight
into the purpose of the statute and its application, 98 the words of the statute
should be conclusive absent congressional silence or ambiguity on a particular
issue. 99
2. Effects on the Private Pension System
Proponents of surplus reversion frequently contend that any policy which
significantly reduces allowable reversions to plan sponsors will result in
undesirable consequences for the pension system as a whole. There are several
facets to this argument favoring reversion.
It is argued that prohibiting reversion would fundamentally alter the basic
tenets of the private pension system. At present, participation by employers
is completely voluntary. ERISA prescribes only minimum standards to be
met once a plan is established. Termination of a pension plan, although
supervised by the PBGC, is also a voluntary decision for the employer. In
general an employer is, and always has been, entitled to free entry into the
pension system and exit from it. This principle has been said to lie "at the
very heart of our pension system."'' 1
Prohibiting reversion might significantly decrease the amount of employer
discretion involved in plan terminations. This, however, depends upon the
manner in which reversions are eliminated. Certainly any proposal that makes
termination difficult where a potential for surplus exists, or that eliminates
terminations altogether, 01 places severe restrictions on plan sponsors. These
proposals should be scrutinized with extreme care. Such methods would
probably have adverse effects on the pension system as a whole, as employers
would become increasingly reluctant to establish an effectively "irreversible"
plan.
97. 2A J. SuTHERLAND, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNsTIucnIoN § 45.01 (1984) ("When an
authoritative written text of the law has been adopted, the particular language of the text is
always the starting point on any question concerning the application of the law."); see also
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 716 (2d Cir. 1971) (the "first catechism of statutory
construction" is to begin with the language of the statute itself). But see Cooper v. Argonaut
Ins. Co., 556 P.2d 525, 526 (Alaska 1976) (court can adopt a position to effect legislative intent
to reach an equitable result even though literal statutory language lends itself to an opposite
outcome).
98. See J. SuT=ar.MN, supra note 97, § 50.01.
99. See id. ("In cases of conflict between legislation and the common law, legislation will
govern because it is the latest expression of the law. Where the language of the statute is
subject to reasonable doubt, reference to common-law principles may provide a valuable clue
as to whether a particular situation is controlled by the statute.") (footnote omitted). But see
Milstein, 453 F.2d at 716 (failing to utilize relevant aids to construction beyond the language
of the statute would "close off the only light available to illumine the statute," even absent
ambiguity).
100. Gaver & Freilich, supra note 69, at 54.
101. For a discussion of one such proposal, see id.
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There are, however, other less extreme ways in which reversions may be
prevented which would have lesser effects on the actual termination decision.
The PBGC and the courts, for example, might be given an increased role
in deciding the true nature of the surplus-whether it arose from intentional
overfunding or from "erroneous actuarial computations." This determina-
tion would be independent of the employer's initial decision to terminate
the plan. Determinations by external sources obviously would have some
effect upon the desirability of termination. Under such a policy, however,
employer independence regarding entry to and exit from the private pension
system would suffer minimal harm.
Perhaps a more valid concern regarding the effects of preventing reversions
is that minimal funding of plans might be encouraged. Several post-ERISA
decisions in this area have stressed the importance of allowing reversions so
that the employer will not be "penalized for overfunding in 'an abundance
of caution."' '" 2 A penalty for overfunding almost certainly would encourage
employers to contribute the smallest possible amount to the fund, thus
increasing the incidence of underfunded plans. Although the PBGC is de-
signed to protect employees from the dangers of underfunded plans, un-
derfunding is clearly an undesirable result, and certainly not one to be
encouraged by the courts.
Finally, there is also substantial concern that prohibiting reversions will
cause employers to shift from Defined Benefit plans to Defined Contribution
plans.10' The reason is simple: if a sponsor cannot reap the benefits of
actuarial errors in its favor, then it will have little reason to bear the risks
of unfavorable actuarial errors. Under a Defined Contribution plan, the
employees bear the risk of economic downturns and are faced with uncertain
retirement incomes. 104
A primary purpose of ERISA is to encourage maintenance of pension
plans, not to so severely restrict employers that they will be discouraged
from maintaining plans at all. The probable adverse effect on the mainte-
nance of securely-funded Defined Benefit plans is, therefore, a compelling
argument in favor of allowing surplus reversion.
3. The Equity Argument
Another argument commonly offered in support of reversion is one based
upon equity principles rather than on statutory interpretation. This argument,
in essence, maintains that, in light of the risks faced by a plan sponsor,
principles of fairness require that any surplus due to inadvertent overfunding
revert to the employer.
102. Moyer, 441 F. Supp. at 1132-33; see also Holliday, 732 F.2d at 552.
103. See supra note 6.
104. See text accompanying note 68.
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Specifically, in the event a plan terminates with assets insufficient to satisfy
its liabilities, the PBGC will pay all nonforfeitable, 0 5 basic', benefits within
certain legal limits.107 Any loss incurred by the PBGC in meeting the benefit
obligations of a terminated plan will obligate the employer to reimburse the
PBGC in full up to thirty percent of the net worth of the company and its
subsidiaries. 08 The presence of the PBGC thus insulates the employees from
the risks of financial uncertainty, but does not protect the employer. Should
a plan terminate, however, with assets more than sufficient to satisfy its
liabilities and reversion is prohibited, the employer is left with no benefit
in return for bearing the risk of poor asset performance or higher than
anicipated costs. This is, essentially, a "no-win" situation for the employer.
It is also obvious that if each employee had bargained for his pension
agreement directly with the employer, the latter would never have assented
to the formation of a contract under which he bears all the risks of inferior
plan performance but reaps no benefits from superior plan performance. It
is also arguable that if the parties never would have agreed to a contract
provision which eliminated reversion, it would be inequitable for the courts
to imply such a provision in pension disputes.
On the other hand, the equity line of reasoning raises the question of
how much benefit, if any, an employer should receive by maintaining a
plan. The argument that any surplus should revert to the employer as
compensation for risk ignores the fact that the employer is already benefitting
from the mere existence of the plan. At least in theory, a pension plan
attracts quality employees and forms part of the compensation "package,"
thereby reducing the actual wages which the employer must pay.' °9 Any
surplus reversion would be an additional benefit to the employer, beyond
that which fairness requires. Principles of equity alone, therefore, are not
sufficient to justify reversion.
V. PROPOSALS
The preceding brief survey of the common arguments for and against
surplus reversion demonstrates why this issue has been the subject of wide-
spread controversy since the enactment of ERISA. Judicial policy in the
area of surplus reversions may be viewed as a continuum of varying degrees
of stringency. At one extreme, the courts would unconditionally prohibit
105. The term "nonforfeitable" is defined at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (1982).
106. A concise definition of a "basic" benefit is found at 26 U.S.C. § 4010)(5) (the Internal
Revenue Code) (repealed 1982).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (1982) prescribes formulas by which these limits may be computed.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(2) (1982).
109. See supra text accompanying note 16 describing the deferred compensation theory of
pensions.
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reversion; at the other, reversion would be permitted regardless of the cir-
cumstances. The disadvantages of prohibiting reversion entirely u ° outweigh
the advantages that might be gained thereby. The dangers of harming the
stability of the entire pension system are substantial when one considers the
probable reaction of employers to a total prohibition on surplus reversions.
The recent enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 may prompt some
to contend that this issue is moot. Arguably, Congress has recognized the
problem and resolved the issue. Section 1132 of the 1986 Act imposes a ten.
percent excise tax on all pension asset reversions resulting from terminations
occurring after 1985.111 However, the ten percent excise tax will likely be
more effective in deterring terminations of plans containing relatively small
surpluses than large ones.11 2 Although, relatively speaking, the tax deprives
both employers of an equal percentage, practically speaking, an already
small surplus becomes hardly worth the administrative "hassle" of recapture
after a ten percent tax.
Therefore, despite Congress' recent attempt to address the issue, a move
in the direction of judicial stringency is still indicated. Tighter scrutiny of
surplus reversions, in conjunction with enforcement of the new excise tax,
would have several beneficial effects: to solidify judicial policy in an area
where federal common law is just being created; to discourage employers
from "pushing to the limit" their uses of pension funds for corporate
purposes, while still encouraging creation and continuation of employee
benefit plans; and finally, to best effectuate the purposes of ERISA.
A. Proposal One-A Change in Judicial Policy
One manner in which the courts might adjust judicial policy to reach an
appropriate degree of stringency is to distinguish among plan surpluses by
means of the circumstances surrounding the underlying terminations. Any
termination executed for the employer's benefit which would harm, or could
potentially harm the employees' interests in the plan would result in the
denial of surplus reversion. If, for example, the court determines that a
terminated plan has been or will likely be replaced by an inferior plan,
reversion should be denied. However, terminations made because a particular
110. This is in contrast to any proposal which might limit those situations in which reversion
is possible.
Ill. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No 99-514, § 1132(a) (1986) (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. § 4980). This section contains several exceptions, however. No tax is imposed on excess
funding due to mistake of law or fact, where the terminated plan is one maintained by a tax-
exempt section 501(a) employer, or where the assets are transferred to an employee stock
ownership plan (ESOP). See PRENTlcE-HALL, A ComPI=rE GUIm TO r TAx REFORM ACT OF
1986 1146-47 (1986).
112. For example, a $10,000 surplus minus the $1,000 tax leaves only $9,000 for recapture;
whereas a $1,000,000 surplus minus the $100,000 tax still leaves a sizeable surplus: $900,000.
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plan is not economically efficient, for example, would result in permissible
reversion. This would necessarily entail a clarification of the meaning of
"exclusive benefit" as used in ERISA section 1103(c)(1).13
In order to implement this proposal effectively, the courts should make
explicit and consistent distinctions between terminations under which rever-
sions would or would not be permitted. By allowing surplus reversion only
when the associated termination is in the employees' best interest, or at least
causes them to suffer no detriment, the courts would effectuate both the
spirit and the letter of ERISA." 4
B. Proposal Two-Amend ERISA to Require Inflation
Adjustments
When Congress enacted ERISA, it recognized that the statute was not a
comprehensive cure for the ills of the private pension system.115 After more
than a decade of experience with ERISA, it is a proper time to consider
amending the statute in areas in which it has proven deficient. Most of these
areas fall outside the scope of this Note." 6 One such area, however, which
is closely related to the issue of pension plan surpluses concerns the ad-
justment of pension benefits for inflation.
Surplus reversion is often criticized by the private sector as being unjust
in light of the inadequacy of retirees' fixed pension incomes due to inflation.
Surpluses often accumulate because plan assets are yielding a higher return
than anticipated. Increased asset yields and inflation often occur simulta-
neously. It is ironic that during periods of inflation reversion provides the
greatest amount to the employer, while plan beneficiaries' defined benefits
experience substantial losses of purchasing power. Retirees are commonly
identified as one of the groups most severely affected by inflation because
of the fixed nature of pension benefits.'1 7
113. See supra text accompanying notes 70-89.
114. Proposal One necessitates another decision. If reversion is denied, to whom is the
surplus allocated? Three viable options arise: (1) the entire surplus could be returned to the
employees; (2) only that portion of the surplus in excess of a "reasonable" amount would be
divided among the participants; or (3) the PBGC could retain all or part of the surplus.
115. Congressman Biester made the following statement during the ERISA hearings:
Although this measure is not a final answer to the problems of the private pension
plan system, once it is enacted, and we have the opportunity to observe its impact
over a period of time we will be in a position to evaluate its effects and then
recommend whatever changes may be warranted.
120 CONG. Rc. 4444 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1974) (statement of Cong. Biester).
116. For example, an area in which ERISA has proven deficient is the inequity which Congress
perceived to exist with respect to qualified retirement plans for female employees and spouses
of employees. Congress responded in 1984 with the passage of the Retirement Equity Act of
1984, Pub. L. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). A
discussion of this and other remedial pension statutes is beyond the scope of this Note.
117. For a discussion of the effects of inflation on pension plan beneficiaries, see E. SHAMO,
MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 431 (1978); A. OKuN, H. FOWLER & M. GILBERT, INFLATION: THE
PROBLEMS IT CREATES AND THE PoLcsS IT REQuIRES 14-15 (1970).
1987]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Opponents of surplus reversion point to the inequity of this phenomenon
in light of the Deferred Wages Theory." 8 It is unlikely that employees would
rationally render services in return for future payment of today's deferred
wages with knowledge that they would be receiving less real income than if
they accepted their full wages when earned.
The courts, however, are quite reluctant to include inflationary consid-
erations in contract law. To do so would create numerous additional dilem-
mas, such as whether to cite frustration, impossibility, or some other legal
concept as a basis for remedial action and what remedies to employ." 9
ERISA also does not address the issue of the effects of inflation on pension
benefits. Although some private plans include cost-of-living features which
automatically adjust benefits for inflation, 120 inclusion of such features is
strictly optional under ERISA. Perhaps the most common method of benefit
adjustment is the use of ad hoc benefit increases,' 2' but once again these
increases are entirely within the discretion of the plan sponsor.
The problem of inflationary effects on pension benefits is one which seems
to have received no satisfactory treatment by ERISA or the courts. Thus,
the final proposal of this Note is that ERISA be amended to require some
sort of cost-of-living adjustment or other indexation of benefits as a universal
pension plan feature. Employers should be allowed the broadest possible
discretion in selecting the type of provision to be included in their plans.
Since ERISA was intended to assure an adequate standard of living for
retired workers, such an amendment would strengthen the effect of the
statute in this respect.
This proposal is germane to the surplus allocation problem because it is
likely that mandatory inflation adjustment of pension benefits would sig-
nificantly decrease the incidence of both shortages and surpluses upon ter-
mination. Indexation of pension benefits would cause benefits and asset
values to fluctuate together. High benefits would accompany high asset
values, thus eliminating surpluses. Depressed asset yields conversely would
render lower plan benefits, thus eliminating a potential deficiency.
The major obstacles to effective implementation of the preceding proposal
are: (1) the likely adverse reaction of employers, and (2) selection of the
proper factor by which to index benefits.'2 If these obstacles could be
overcome, however, this proposal would improve the effectiveness of ERISA
118. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
119. See K. RosENN, LAw AND INFLATIoN 84-90 (1981), for a discussion of judicial treatment
of inflation as affecting contractual performance.
120. See, e.g., Shaw v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace, 563 F. Supp. 653
(C.D. Cal. 1983).
121. For a comprehensive description of this and other methods of benefit adjustment, see
D. McGILL, supra note 28, at 192-96.
122. Possible suggestions include indexing to: the Consumer Price Index (CPI), a general
wage index, or the minimum wage. See K. ROSENN, supra note 119, at 197.
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in the area of providing retirement income security, while simultaneously
alleviating to a substantial degree the courts' dilemma over the proper al-
location of huge surpluses.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of ERISA in 1974 provided a comprehensive body of
statutory law to govern the complex area of private pension plans. Equally
complex are the issues presented to the courts in the process of forming a
corresponding body of federal common law. A prime example of this com-
plexity is the issue of whether surplus pension assets should revert to the
employer in the event of plan termination.
The survey of arguments for and against reversion indicates that a less
extreme alternative than complete prohibition of reversion is desirable. One
suggested policy change is to distinguish between terminations which in some
way benefit the participants and those which strictly benefit the employer.
Surpluses arising from terminations in the latter category would not revert.
A final proposal suggested in this Note involves an amendment to the Act
itself rather than a change in judicial policy. An amendment to ERISA
which would make inflation adjustment of plan benefits mandatory would
increase post-retirement income security for beneficiaries, and might also
reduce the overall incidence and size of both asset surpluses and shortages,
depending on how benefits would be indexed. Although legislative amend-
ment is a serious step, the proposal is worthy of consideration.
JENNImFR L. PRATT
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